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Governments in modern societies undertake an array of complex
functions that shape politics and economics, individual and group
behavior, and the natural, social, and built environment. How are
governments structured to execute these diverse responsibilities?
How do those structures vary, and what explains the differences?
To examine these longstanding questions, we develop a technique for
mapping Internet “footprint” of government with network science
methods. We use this approach to describe and analyze the diversity
in functional scale and structure among the 50 US state governments
reflected in the webpages and links they have created online: 32.5
million webpages and 110 million hyperlinks among 47,631 agencies.
We first verify that this extensive online footprint systematically re-
flects known characteristics: 50 hierarchically organized networks of
state agencies that scale with population and are specialized around
easily identifiable functions in accordance with legal mandates. We
also find that the footprint reflects extensive diversity among these
state functional hierarchies. We hypothesize that this variation should
reflect, among other factors, state income, economic structure, ideol-
ogy, and location. We find that government structures are most
strongly associated with state economic structures, with location
and income playing more limited roles. Voters’ recent ideological pref-
erences about the proper roles and extent of government are not
significantly associated with the scale and structure of their state gov-
ernments as reflected online. We conclude that the online footprint of
governments offers a broad and comprehensivewindow on how they
are structured that can help deepen understanding of those structures.
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Governments play a complex role in modern societies, shapingpolitics and economics, individual and group behavior, and the
natural, social, and built environment by making and enforcing laws;
protecting rights; resolving disputes; coordinating and regulating
markets; providing security, infrastructure, and public services like
education and health care; preserving the natural environment; raising
tax revenue to pay for it all; and a wide array of other functions. How
are governments structured to simultaneously execute this diverse
array of responsibilities? Howmuch do these structures vary, and what
explains that variation? Scholars have explored these questions for
generations, but empirical research into basic aspects of how gov-
ernments work is limited by a lack of comprehensive, reliable, com-
parable data on what governments do and how they are organized.
To help bridge this gap, we develop an approach to mapping
and characterizing the functional structures of modern govern-
ments with network science methods using their online foot-
prints: agency websites and hyperlinks among them. We then use
this technique to represent and analyze the scale and structure of
the bureaucratic networks of functionally specialized agencies
that the 50 US state governments have formed to implement
their varied responsibilities. The United States is an ideal setting
for examining government structures in comparative perspective
because its decentralized institutional framework provides states
wide latitude to organize their governments as they see fit within
a common political and economic union.
We find that the extensive online footprint of state governments
offers a reflection of their functional structures that in aggregate is
comprehensive, substantively valid, and useful for deepening our
understanding of those structures and of the factors relevant to what
they do and how they work. We first establish that the online net-
work of state agency websites and hyperlinks among them system-
atically reflects the functions state agencies perform and exhibits
several known characteristics of the bureaucratic structures they
have created to perform them, including accordance with formal
legal mandates, hierarchical principal–agent relationships, and
scaling with population. We then analyze the substantial variation
the footprint reflects in the scale, density, and connectedness of
these functional structures to evaluate their relative associations with
ideology (1–3), economic structure (4–12), income (13, 14), and
location (15, 16)—four factors widely hypothesized to be associated
with what governments do and how they work. We find that varia-
tion to be most strongly related to state economic structures, with
income and location playing more limited roles. We find no signif-
icant association with citizens’ recent ideological opinions about the
proper roles and extent of government on the liberal-conservative
spectrum. We conclude that the unusual breadth and depth of the
Significance
Understanding of modern government is limited by a lack of
comprehensive, reliable, comparable data on what governments
do and how they are organized to execute their diverse re-
sponsibilities. We demonstrate that such data can be collected
from the extensive footprint that governments leave on the In-
ternet, opening a range of unresolved puzzles and questions
about modern government to closer empirical inquiry. The online
footprint of the 50 US state governments reflects their close
embeddedness with state economies and suggests that other
factors widely hypothesized to influence government play more
limited roles, including location and income. It also casts doubt on
the degree to which state government functional structures sys-
tematically reflect voters’ recent ideological preferences.
Author contributions: S.K., M.C., and R.H. conceived the study; M.C. designed the data-
collection methodology; S.K., M.C., E.S., A.-L.B., and R.H. designed the analyses; E.S. de-
veloped and implemented the functional classification; K.A. created the figures; and S.K.
wrote the paper with assistance from A.-L.B. and R.H.
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.
This open access article is distributed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives License 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND).
Data deposition: Replication scripts and all data used in the paper have been deposited in
the Harvard Dataverse (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/govmaps) and are also
available at govmaps.cid.hks.harvard.edu.
1S.K. and M.C. contributed equally to this work.
2To whom correspondence may be addressed. Email: ricardo_hausmann@hks.harvard.edu or
alb@northeastern.edu.
This article contains supporting information online at www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.
1073/pnas.1803228115/-/DCSupplemental.
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1803228115 PNAS Latest Articles | 1 of 6
PO
LI
TI
CA
L
SC
IE
N
CE
S
online presence of governments has opened an analytically useful
window on modern government, and end with several addi-
tional puzzles and questions about modern governments that
their Internet footprints may open to closer empirical inquiry.
The Internet Footprint of US State Governments
We crawled the web to collect publicly available digital traces of
state government agencies in 2014, including the content of
agency webpages and the hyperlinks among them (Fig. 1).
We interpret agency websites as representations of public agencies
implementing public responsibilities; the title of each agency’s page as
representing the agency’s function and the number of pages as an
approximate reflection of the scope or density of its activities in
implementing that function; and hyperlinks between agency webpages
as one agency reporting the relevance of another to its activities.
Although some government functions lack an open Internet presence,
our crawl recovered an extensive online footprint: the websites
of 47,631 state agencies, with a total of 32.5 million webpages and
110 million hyperlinks among them. For example, among the 2,453
public agencies we identify in the State of New York are the State
Assembly, which has the majority of its connections to the Senate; the
Lottery Division, which is strongly connected to the Gaming Com-
mission, which oversees its operations, and more weakly connected to
the Alcoholism and Substance Abuse Office; and the Joint Com-
mission on Public Ethics, which is almost completely isolated aside
from links from several universities. The number of these websites
grew rapidly through the 1990s and early 2000s, averaging 79% an-
nually from 1996 to 2002, and in recent years has slowed to less than
2% annually, suggesting that most agencies that are going to repre-
sent themselves online have already done so. (See SI Appendix, sec-
tions 1 and 2 on data gathering and limitations.)
Altogether, these digital traces offer a detailed reflection of
the bureaucratic structures by which state governments imple-
ment their diverse responsibilities.
Functional Specialization in the Footprint
Based on their websites, the functional range of these 47,631
agencies exceeds the most comprehensive current classification
of government functions, the US Census Bureau’s Census of
Governments. For example, the Census does not include in-
ternational trade; financing authorities; ethics, lobbying, and
campaign finance commissions; utilities regulation; civil and
human rights; support for children and families; and public
and indigent defense—all activities that the websites of gov-
ernment agencies regularly describe as their primary functions.
To develop a classification system that includes the full functional
range of state governments, we used Latent Derelict Analysis to
generate keywords representing each function as described in agency
website titles, matched each to the corresponding functional category
in the Census, and appended new categories for functions not among
the Census categories. The result is a classification system that ex-
pands the 51 Census categories into 166 specific functions (e.g.,
Consumer Protection and Education; Fire Protection) nested within
28 general categories (e.g., Commerce and Economic Development;
Public Safety). Table 1 lists the 28 general categories; see SI Ap-
pendix, section 3 for specific functions. Agencies whose website titles
contained keywords pertaining to only one functional category were
assigned to that category; we manually reviewed and assigned all
agencies with keywords pertaining to multiple categories.
To validate our classifications, we asked independent assessors
on Mechanical Turk with no expertise or training in government to
classify the functions of 8,574 agencies with our system: a random
sample of agencies engaged in the most common functions
(schools, libraries, and municipal and county administrations) and
every other agency. Agreement among individual assessors was high
(κ = 0.89), and agreement with our classifications was 95%.
In short, the Internet footprint of US state governments pro-
vides a detailed and comprehensive picture of 47,631 agencies
specialized to perform a wide array of functions that are easily
identifiable to independent, untrained assessors, and the range
of which exceeds the most comprehensive current national clas-
sification of government functions.
Formal Mandates and Hierarchy in the Footprint
To validate the aggregate reflection the websites and hyperlinks
of these 47,631 public agencies offer of the bureaucratic struc-
tures of state governments, we first establish that it reflects two
known structural characteristics of modern democratic govern-
ment: formal legal mandates and hierarchical organization
around principal–agent relationships.
To examine the degree to which state agency websites and hy-
perlinks reflect the structures mandated by law, we manually
generated the functional structure mandated by the laws of one
state, Massachusetts, and compared it to the structure reflected on
the Internet in 2014. Both agency websites and the relationships
among them clearly reflect the mandates of the Massachusetts
General Laws (Fig. 1B). Of the 552 agencies mandated by law, 392
had websites; those that did not were largely small advisory groups
and committees (for example, the state’s American and Canadian
Fig. 1. The Internet footprint of US state governments. (A) The process for
generating and validating the data on state government functional struc-
tures. (B) The structure of the Massachusetts state government reflected
online is significantly similar to the structure mandated by the Massachusetts
General Laws. Red nodes and links are present in both the online and
mandated networks; yellow nodes and links are present only in the man-
dated network; blue nodes and links are present only in the online network.
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French Cultural Exchange Commission). Connections among these
agencies also strongly reflect the ways agencies are mandated to in-
teract. We examined four types of mandated interactions, requiring
that one agency: (i) directly oversee; (ii) seek advice from; (iii) grant
permission to or audit; or (iv) serve on a committee with another
agency. Thirty-six percent of these mandated connections are reflected
online, and overall agencies with a mandate to interact are unusually
strongly connected online, with eight times as many hyperlinks be-
tween them as the average interagency connection. In aggregate, the
online reflection of these mandated connections is beyond statistical
doubt: We randomly generated 10,000 networks with the same
number of agencies and connections to and from each agency as
Massachusetts law mandates, but in which the specific agencies each
agency connects to and from were randomly determined. Connections
among agencies in only one of these random networks were more
similar to the connections mandated by law than the connections
reflected online (P < 0.0001; SI Appendix, Fig. S6.1). The position of
an agency in the mandated network explains 55% of the variance in
the position of that agency’s website relative to other agencies’ web-
sites, and the linear correlation of agencies’ positions in the mandated
and online networks is 0.748. The mandated and online networks also
reflect similar degrees of separation among agencies: Webpages of
agencies connected directly in the mandated network have an average
of 105 hyperlinks between them; those with two degrees of separation
in the mandated network have an average of four hyperlinks; and
those with three degrees of separation have fewer than one hyperlink
on average between them (SI Appendix, Fig. S6.1). This overlap is the
first indication that the online structure of government reflects its real-
world functional structure systematically, if imperfectly. See SI Ap-
pendix, section 6 for detailed measures and tests with high-level or-
ganizational structures for three additional states, each showing
similarly strong overlap with those states’ online networks.
Agencies and their interactions are also shaped by mandates other
than state law (e.g., municipal or federal) and by discretionary self-
organization (17–19). Massachusetts’ online footprint reflects these to
some degree as well. For example, it includes websites for 1,284 schools,
early childhood centers, libraries, municipal and county administrative
agencies, police stations, and other agencies not specified in the
General Laws. Hyperlinks between agency websites also reflect 1,743
meaningful but nonmandated connections among mandated agen-
cies: for example, from the state’s Board of Registration in Medicine
to the Executive Office of Health and Human Services (Fig. 1B).
Overall, the footprint reflects 50 such networks of agencies,
organized by state (Fig. 2A). Almost all (99.09%) of hyperlinks
among agencies are between agencies in the same state. Fig. 2A
visualizes the entire state government agency network and Fig. 2B
the Massachusetts portion of this network.
The 50 networks also reflect a second characteristic of modern
government bureaucracies: hierarchical principal–agent relations
(19–21). At the center of almost every state’s online network are
websites of governing bodies mandated to be atop its hierarchy,
including the governor, legislature, and county and municipal ad-
ministrations. Agencies engaged in these functions link to and from
clusters of agencies and departments responsible for other functions;
these in turn link to and from the websites of agencies engaged in
more specific functions, such as schools or hospitals. Several net-
work science measures indicate that these interconnections strongly
reflect a flow hierarchy, in which higher-order structures contain and
connect to structures directly beneath, as when information and
direction flows frommanagers to subordinates. For instance, 55% of
interagency connections lead in only one direction, offering no path
back to that agency or to other agencies engaged in the same
function (22). (See SI Appendix, section 5 for additional tests.) We
generated 10,000 networks with the same number of agencies and
connections to and from each agency as the online footprint, but in
which all connections are randomly distributed; on average only 5%
of connections in these random networks were hierarchical (±2%).
In addition, reciprocity—one agency connecting back to an agency
that connects to it—is more common within than between most
functions, suggesting clustering in functional communities. Only
three functions have reciprocal connections more commonly with
agencies engaged in other functions: international trade, homeland
security, and ethics, lobbying, and campaign finance commissions.
(See SI Appendix, section 5 and Table S5.1; ethics is also the least
reciprocated function: just 6% of links from ethics agencies are re-
ciprocated.) Fig. 2C displays online connections between functions,
aggregated across all states, and Fig. 2D state-specific networks for
Massachusetts, Georgia, and South Carolina. Fig. 3A depicts the
hierarchy of the aggregate state government by organizing functions
by betweenness centrality, with the most centrally connected func-
tion at the top and center. (For comparison, SI Appendix, Fig. S5.1B
displays a random network lacking hierarchical organization.)
Altogether, we find that the online footprint of state govern-
ments, in addition to offering a substantially valid and unusually
comprehensive reflection of the functions state governments
implement, also reflects several known characteristics of the
bureaucratic structures they form to do so, including accordance
with legal mandates and hierarchical organization.
How Much Do State Functional Structures Vary?
The United States is a decentralized federation in which states have
wide latitude to govern themselves differently. Their online foot-
print reflects considerable diversity in their functional structures.
First, the footprint suggests variation in what state governments
do. Some functions, like research and science; international trade;
and ethics, lobbying, and campaign finance, appear in the foot-
print of few states. Only seven functions appear in the online
footprints of all state governments (SI Appendix, section 3).
States’ online footprints also suggest wide variation in the bu-
reaucratic structures they have formed to implement most func-
tions. Fig. 4 displays, for each functional category, the diversity of
implementation across states on three dimensions observable in
the footprint: (i) the number of agencies engaged in each function,
representing “scale” of implementation; (ii) the average number
of pages per agency website, representing “density” of the activi-
ties around that function; (iii) the proportion of agencies engaged
in the function that are connected by hyperlinks, directly or
through other agencies, representing the function’s degree of
“connectedness”; and (iv) overall diversity on all three measures.
(See SI Appendix, section 7 for details, alternative measures, and
visualizations of six functions of varying diversity.)
As government scales, it is thought to converge around common
forms, as agencies learn from each other and develop common
understandings of how to organize themselves effectively and le-
gitimately (23, 24). The online footprint of the most common state
functions, education and local administration, reflects this tendency:
They are relatively more organizationally similar across states. Sev-
eral of the rarest state functions are also more structurally similar,
Table 1. The functions of state governments
Administrative Law (4) Historic Preservation (3)
Audits, Accountability, and
Inspectors General
Boards and Professional
Licensing (22)
Homeland Security International Trade
Business Regulation (8) Judicial and Legal (6)
Commerce and Economic
Development (8)
Executive and General
Administration (10)
Criminal Justice (6) Legislative
Data and Information (4) Military
Education (9) Public Safety (6)
Environment, Energy, Agriculture,
and Natural Resources (15)
Ethics, Lobbying, and
Campaign Finance
Research and Science (3) Social Services (10)
Labor and Human Resources (5) Tourism and Travel (2)
Financial Administration (8) Transportation (6)
Financing Authorities (5) Treasury and Revenue (2)
Health and Human Services (14) Utilities (4)
Number of specific functions are in parentheses (SI Appendix, section 3).
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including international trade and ethics, lobbying, and campaign fi-
nance. However, most functions exhibit considerable organizational
diversity across states, and even the most similar exhibit important
relative differences. For example, the scale of state education systems
ranges from 23 schools and other education agencies per million in-
habitants in Texas to 573 per million inhabitants in Vermont; their
average density from 230 pages per agency website in Hawaii to 2,361
in Wyoming; and the proportion of their connections that are with
other education agencies from 89% in Kentucky to 49% in Hawaii.
An additional known characteristic of modern government is that
it scales with population (17, 25). Although some state functions,
such as the governor or the legislature, are typically performed by the
same number of bodies in states large and small, many others involve
localized implementation and face-to-face contact with citizens (18).
In general, both online scale and density of state governments is
greater in more populous states. But only two functions account for
most of this scaling, schools and local administrations; their websites
are more numerous, denser, and more connected in states with
larger populations. For the other 26 functional categories, state
population explains only 4% of cross-state variance in scale, 12% of
density, and 4% of connectedness (SI Appendix, section 7 and Fig.
S7.1). Even scaling in schools and local administrations is less than
linear, suggesting economies of scale similar to those underlying
growth in most complex social and biological systems (26, 27).
In short, we find substantial structural diversity among state
governments. Although the most common functions tend toward
structural similarity across states, most functions exhibit wide
diversity in scale, density, and connectedness, variation that only
partly reflects scaling with state population.
Why Else Do State Governments Differ?
As governments shape and respond to the people and places they
govern, they come to reflect their environments. However, there
is substantial debate about the factors that modern governments
reflect. We focus here on four factors widely hypothesized to be
associated with what governments do and how they work:
i) Ideology. Citizens differ in their preferences about the roles
and extent of government, differences in part reflected in the
liberal-conservative ideological continuum. Thus, ideologi-
cally similar states may have more similar governments (1–3).
ii) Economic Structure. Scholars have long noted a strong and
likely strengthening (28, 29) relationship between government
and the economy, as economic agents demand enabling goods
Fig. 2. The functional networks of US state government agencies. (A) Agencies strongly cluster in state, rather than functional, communities. We highlight
three such state agency communities: Georgia’s (green), South Carolina’s (blue), and Massachusetts’s (red). (B) The Massachusetts portion of the network in A;
node size is proportional to the number of pages in each agency’s website (our proxy of density). (C) The functional network aggregated across all states.
Node size is proportional to the number of agencies engaged in the function (scale) in all states, arranged from center to periphery according to volume of
hyperlinks. (D) The functional networks of the Georgia, South Carolina, and Massachusetts governments. Georgia’s government has more in common with
Massachusetts’ than with South Carolina’s, a state closer ideologically and physically.
Fig. 3. State functional structure shows strongly hierarchical organization.
Functional nodes are arrayed on the x axis according to the betweenness centrality
of the general function of which they are a part; those in the middle are the most
central. The y axis sorts each of the 166 specific functions according to their cen-
trality, from top to bottom. (See full-scale figure in SI Appendix, Fig. S5.1.)
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and services from government for their industry or occupation
(4–8) and government rules, regulations, goods, and services
influence economic activity (9–12). Thus, economically simi-
lar states may have more similar governments.
iii) Income. Governments draw much of their revenue from their
citizens, and the elasticity of their demand for government may
vary across functions, such that state governments may be more
similar when their citizens have similar incomes (13, 14).
iv) Location. The United States spans a large and varied natural
environment, differences in which may have implications for
what government does and how (15, 16). Location may also
facilitate organizational learning and convergence around com-
mon forms, in general as well as for particular functions (23, 24).
Thus, similarly located states may have similar governments.
To investigate the relative role of these four factors, for every pair of
states we calculate similarity in the (i) scale, (ii) density, and (iii)
connectedness of state agencies implementing each of the 28 func-
tional categories, as well as (iv) similarity across all three dimensions
(n = 1,225). Table 2 reports whether the structures of two state gov-
ernments across the vector of all functions, normalized across states,
are significantly more similar on these four measures when they are
similar in ideology (lagged 2005–2010), economic structure (employ-
ment by industry), income (GDP per capita), and location (distance
between the two states), controlling for connections between their
agencies and fixed effects for population and other unobserved state
characteristics (see SI Appendix, section 8 for details on variables).
The explanatory power of economic structure far exceeds the
others. How citizens in a state earn their living—measured by the
proportion employed in grocery stores, doctors offices, coal
mining, scientific research and development, or the other 311
industries measured by the Census (SI Appendix, section 8)—is
strongly related to similarities in state governments on all four
measures. Location and income play more limited roles. Lo-
cation predicts similarities in the density and connectedness of
state functional structures but not similarity in their scale. In-
come is weakly associated with similarity in scale and unrelated
to similarity in either density or connectedness. Similarity in
ideological preferences is unassociated with similarities in state
functional structures on any of the four measures. (See SI Ap-
pendix, section 8 for detailed results and robustness checks.)
The relative strength of the association between economic and
government structure may reflect state governments responding
to their economies by providing complementary public goods and
services (4, 6); shaping their economies, as capital and labor adjust
to the enabling goods and services that the state’s government
provides (10, 12); or both, as state governments and economies
coevolve (7, 11). The cross-sectional correlations in our data can-
not disentangle these dynamics. However, they strongly support
the relationship itself. A few examples illustrate the overriding
relative importance of state economic structures to structural
similarities between state governments. Georgia and Mas-
sachusetts share similar governments and economic structures (top
4% and 19%, respectively), despite their physical separation and
dissimilarity in ideology (bottom 1%) and income (bottom 13%);
indeed, based on their online footprints, Georgia’s government is
more similar to Massachusetts’ than to its northern neighbor South
Carolina’s (Fig. 2D). California and Florida have among the most
similar economies of any two states (top 2%) as well as similar
government structures (top 11%) despite differences in location,
ideology (bottom 32%), and income (bottom 26%). Illinois and
Indiana differ in average ideology and income (bottom 4% and 3%
of other pairs of states, respectively) but share similar economic
structures (top 1% of state pairs) and a border, and their gov-
ernments appear online to have similar structures (top 2% of state
pairs). Georgia and Virginia are nearby and have similar econo-
mies (top 12%), and their governments are among the top 2% in
online structural similarity, despite being among the bottom 15%
in ideological overlap and bottom 23% in income similarity.
In short, the strongest predictor of whether two state gov-
ernments have similar functional structures is similarity in their
economic structures, outweighing similarities in location, in-
come, and the ideological preferences of voters.
Fig. 4. The functional structures of state governments vary widely. A–C display the SD (σ) across states in the scale, density, and connectedness of each
function. (D) Structural diversity among states for each function, normalized across the three dimensions, from bottom to top in ascending order of diversity.
The SD (shaded) indicates the diversity of the function across states (see SI Appendix, section 7 for details and additional visualizations).
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Concluding Remarks
Like the states they govern, US state governments are enormously
complex and multifaceted, limiting understanding of how they work.
We develop a technique for mapping their functional structures using
the extensive footprint that they leave online. Online reflections are
always imperfect approximations of real-world phenomena (e.g., social
networks on Facebook; ref. 30). However, we find strong evidence that
in aggregate, these digital traces offer a comprehensive and valid re-
flection of the bureaucratic structures states have formed to implement
their varied responsibilities, a reflection that can advance our under-
standing of those structures and the factors that explain them. The
representation that emerges is recognizable in important ways,
reflecting 50 state-centric hierarchies that are functionally special-
ized, conform to legal mandates, and scale with population. We also
find that interstate similarities in these structures vary significantly
according to the industries in which citizens work and to a lesser
degree with income and location, but not with voters’ recent ideo-
logical preferences about the proper roles and extent of government.
These patterns raise several questions. Does the relative similarity
of education and local administration reflect convergence around an
optimal form (10, 31)? Are economic and geographic conditions
more important in determining government structure than citizens’
ideological preferences, or does ideology influence government
structure more slowly, such that current structures reflect the pref-
erences of voters from decades or generations past (32–35)? Why is
location not associated with the scale of state government as well as
its density and connectedness? Why is income associated with scale
but not density or connectedness? More broadly, what else has
shaped the functional variation in state governments observable
online? Our full model, including all four factors, explains 91% of
similarity in the scope of each pair of state governments, but only
50% of similarity in density and 39% of similarity in connectedness.
Inasmuch as the remaining variation reflects real differences in state
governments rather than artifacts of website designs (SI Appendix,
section 2), what explains it? Is the key factor forms of economic or
organizational competition (9, 24, 31, 36) or organizational learning
and emulation (23, 24, 37, 38) not captured in our measures, eco-
nomic and industrial policies (12, 39), the nature or timing of in-
dustrial transformation (4, 20, 40), the accompanying transformation
of social groups and relationships (41–45), vested interests (6, 8, 46–
48), inequality (28, 29, 49), shocks or critical junctures in the political,
economic, or social environment (33, 34), all or some combination of
the above, or factors yet to be considered? Finally, as agencies in-
creasingly interact with businesses, interest groups, and other orga-
nizations online or in ways reflected online, these reflections may
allow more systematic examination of agency relations with the so-
cieties they govern (7, 8, 11, 23, 29, 44).
These are the sorts of questions and puzzles we hope this
window on government enables scholars to more closely explore.
In addition, we expect the picture itself to improve over time, as
more government activity and interaction with citizens is reflected
online, and as future crawls permit a dynamic view on the struc-
tural evolution of government.
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Table 2. What explains similarities in the functional structures
of state governments
Factors Scale Density Connect. Overall
Ideology 0.001 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Income 0.003* −0.003 −0.004 −0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Economic structure −0.016** −0.012** −0.011* −0.012**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Location −0.002 −0.007** −0.009** −0.006**
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
FE Y Y Y Y
Obs. 1,225 1,225 1,225 1,225
R2 0.91 0.54 0.44 0.53
Adj R2 0.9 0.5 0.39 0.49
**P < 0.01; *P < 0.05 All models also include a control for network position.
See SI Appendix, section 8 for bivariate results, variable definitions, and
robustness checks. Connect., connectedness; Obs., observations.
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